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Prospection lies at the core of cognition: it is the means by which an agent – a person
or a cognitive robot – shifts its perspective from immediate sensory experience to
anticipate future events, be they the actions of other agents or the outcome of its own
actions. Prospection, accomplished by internal simulation, requires mechanisms for both
perceptual imagery and motor imagery. While it is known that these two forms of imagery
are tightly entwined in the mirror neuron system, we do not yet have an effective model
of the mentalizing network which would provide a framework to integrate declarative
episodic and procedural memory systems and to combine experiential knowledge
with skillful know-how. Such a framework would be founded on joint perceptuo-motor
representations. In this paper, we examine the case for this form of representation,
contrasting sensory-motor theory with ideo-motor theory, and we discuss how such a
framework could be realized by joint episodic-procedural memory. We argue that such
a representation framework has several advantages for cognitive robots. Since episodic
memory operates by recombining imperfectly recalled past experience, this allows it to
simulate new or unexpected events. Furthermore, by virtue of its associative nature,
joint episodic-procedural memory allows the internal simulation to be conditioned by
current context, semantic memory, and the agent’s value system. Context and semantics
constrain the combinatorial explosion of potential perception-action associations and
allow effective action selection in the pursuit of goals, while the value system provides
the motives that underpin the agent’s autonomy and cognitive development. This joint
episodic-procedural memory framework is neutral regarding the final implementation of
these episodic and procedural memories, which can be configured sub-symbolically
as associative networks or symbolically as content-addressable image databases and
databases of motor-control scripts.
Keywords: autonomy, cognitive system, development, episodic memory, ideo-motor theory, internal simulation,
procedural memory, prospection
Introduction
The goal of this article is to argue the case of the use of joint episodicmemory to facilitate prospection
and goal-directed action in cognitive robotics. The article begins with insights from the biological
sciences regarding the prospective nature of action, leading to a discussion of the role of memory
in prospection, and the realization of prospection through internal simulation. This sets the scene
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for the introduction of ideo-motor theory, vis-à-vis sensory-
motor theory, and an explanation of the importance of joint
perceptuo-motor representations. This is then followed by two
examples of how these principles have been applied in cognitive
architectures and an argument in favor of explicit perceptuo-
motor memory – joint episodic-procedural memory – over
perceptuo-motormappings.We finish with a description of a sim-
ple proof-of-principle example implementation of joint episodic-
procedural memory for overt attention.
The Goal-Directed and Prospective Nature
of Action
Evidence from many different fields of research, including psy-
chology and neuroscience, suggests that the movements of bio-
logical organisms are organized as actions and not reactions (von
Hofsten, 2004). While reactions are elicited by earlier events,
actions are initiated by a motivated subject, they are defined by
goals, and they are guided by prospective information (Vernon
et al., 2010). For example, when performing manipulation tasks
or observing someone else performing them, subjects fixate on
the goals and sub-goals of the movements not on the body parts,
e.g., the hands or the objects (Johansson et al., 2001; Flanagan and
Johansson, 2003). This happens only if a goal-directed action is
implied. When showing the same movements without the context
of an agent, subjects fixate the moving object instead of the goal.
Evidence from neuroscience also shows that the brain repre-
sents movements in terms of actions even at the level of neural
processes [see Vernon et al. (2010), Chapter 4]. For example, the
primate brain has two areas devoted to controlling movements:
the premotor cortex and the motor cortex. The premotor cortex
is the area of the brain that is active during motor planning and
it influences the motor cortex which then executes the motor
program comprising an action. The premotor cortex receives
strong visual inputs from a region in the brain known as the
inferior parietal lobule. These inputs serve a series visuomotor
transformations for reaching (Area F4) and grasping (Area F5).
Single neuron studies have shown that most F5 neurons code
for specific goal-directed actions, rather than their constituent
movements. Furthermore, several F5 neurons, in addition to their
motor properties, respond also to visual stimuli. These are referred
to as visuomotor neurons. The significance of this is that the
premotor cortex of primates encodes actions (including implicit
goals and expected states) and not just movements. The goal,
therefore, is the fundamental property of the action rather than
the specific motoric details of how it is achieved.
In primates, two classes of visuomotor neurons can be distin-
guished within area F5: canonical neurons and mirror neurons
(Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 1998). The activity of both canonical and
mirror neurons correlates with two distinct circumstances. In the
case of canonical neurons, the same canonical neuron fires when
a monkey sees a particular object and also when the monkey
actually grasps an object with the same characteristic features. On
the other hand, mirror neurons (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti
et al., 1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) are activated both
when an action is performed and when the same or similar action
is observed being performed by another agent. These neurons are
specific to the goal of the action and not themechanics of carrying
it out. So, for example, a monkey observing another monkey, or
a human, reaching for a nut will cause mirror neurons in the
premotor cortex to fire; these are the same neurons that fire when
the monkey actually reaches for a nut. However, if the monkey
observes another monkey making exactly the same movements
but there is no nut present – there is no apparent goal of the
reaching action – then the mirror neurons do not fire. Similarly,
differentmotions that comprise the same goal-directed action will
cause the same mirror neurons to fire. It is the action that matters:
mirror neurons are not active if there is no explicit or implied
goal. Since goals focus on the future, not the present, this again
demonstrates the importance of prospection in action.
Finally, there is another reason why actions are guided by
prospective information as opposed to instantaneous feedback
data. Often, events in the agent’s world may precede the feedback
signals about them because the delays in the control pathways
of biological systems may be substantial. If you cannot rely on
feedback, the only way to overcome the problem is to anticipate
what is going to happen next and to use that information to control
one’s behavior.
Prospection, then, is central to cognition. The question is how
this prospection is achieved. The answer is, somewhat surpris-
ingly, memory.
Memory
Memory facilitates the persistence of knowledge and forms a
reservoir of experience. Without it, it would be impossible for the
system to learn, develop, adapt, recognize, plan, deliberate, and
reason (Vernon, 2014). Memory functions to preserve what has
been achieved through learning and development, ensuring that,
when a cognitive system adapts to new circumstances, it does not
lose its ability to act effectively in situations towhich it had adapted
previously. But memory has another role in addition to preserving
past experience: to anticipate the future. It forms the basis for
one of the central pillars of cognitive capacity, i.e., the ability to
simulate internally the outcomes of possible actions and select the
one that seems most appropriate for the current situation. Viewed
in this light, memory can be seen as a mechanism that allows
a cognitive agent to prepare to act, overcoming through antici-
pation the inherent “here-and-now” limitations of its perceptual
capabilities.
We can distinguishmemory inmany ways (Squire, 2004;Wood
et al., 2012). For example, it can be distinguished on the basis of
the nature of what is remembered and the type of access we have
to it. Specifically, memory can be categorized as either declarative
or procedural, depending on whether it captures knowledge of
things – facts – or actions – skills. Sometimes they are charac-
terized as memory of knowledge and know-how: “knowing that”
and “knowing how.”1 This distinction applies mainly to long-term
memory but short-term memory too has a declarative aspect.
Declarative memory is sometimes referred to as propositional
memory because it refers to information about the agent’s world
1The distinction between knowing that and knowing how was made in 1949 by
Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind (Ryle, 1949)
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that can be expressed in the form of propositions. This is signifi-
cant because propositions are either true or false. Thus, declarative
memory typically deals with factual information. This is not the
case with skill-oriented procedural memory. As a consequence,
declarative memories, in the form of knowledge, can be commu-
nicated from one agent to another through language, for example,
whereas procedural memories can only be demonstrated.
Two different types of declarative memory can be distin-
guished. These are episodic memory and semantic memory.
Episodic memory (Tulving, 1972, 1984) plays a key role in cog-
nition and in the anticipatory aspect of cognition in particular. It
refers to specific instances in the agent’s experiencewhile semantic
memory refers to general knowledge about the agent’s world
which may be independent of the agent’s specific experiences. In
this sense, episodicmemory is autobiographical. By its very nature
in encapsulating some specific event in the agent’s experience,
episodic memory has an explicit spatial and temporal context:
what happened, where it happened, and when it happened. This
temporal sequencing is the only element of structure in episodic
memory. Episodic memory is a fundamentally constructive pro-
cess (Seligman et al., 2013). Each time an event is assimilated into
episodic memory, past episodes are reconstructed. However, they
are reconstructed a little differently each time. This constructive
characteristic is related to the role that episodic memory plays
in the process of internal simulation that forms the basis of
prospection, the key anticipatory function of cognition.
In contrast, semantic memory “is the memory necessary for
the use of language. It is a mental thesaurus, organized knowl-
edge a person possesses about words and other verbal symbols,
their meaning and referents, about relations among them, and
about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of the
symbols, concepts, and relations.”2
Episodic memory and semantic memory differ in many ways.
In general, semantic memory is associated with how we under-
stand (or model) the world around us, using facts, ideas, and
concepts. On the other hand, episodic memory is closely asso-
ciated with experience: perceptions and sensory stimulus. While
episodic memory has no structure other than its temporal
sequencing, semantic memory is highly structured to reflect
the relationships between constituent concepts, ideas, and facts.
Also, the validity (or truth, since semantic memory is a subset
of propositional declarative memory) of semantic memories is
based on social agreement rather than personal belief, as it is
with episodic memory.3 Semantic memory can be derived from
episodic memory through a process of generalization and consol-
idation. Episodic memory can be both short-term and long-term
while semantic memory and procedural memory are long-term.
Memory and Prospection
Memory plays at least four roles in cognition: it allows us
to remember past events, anticipate future ones, imagine the
2This quotation explaining the characteristics of semanticmemory appears in Endel
Tulving’s 1972 article (Tulving, 1972), p. 386 and is quoted in his Précis (Tulving,
1984). While this definition of semantic memory dates from 1972, it is still valid
today. It also explains the linguistic origins of the term.
3Semantic memory and episodic memory can be contrasted in many other ways:
twenty-seven differences are listed in Tulving (1983), p. 35.
viewpoint of other people, and navigate around our world. All
four involve self-projection: the ability of an agent to shift per-
spective from itself in the here-and-now and to take an alternative
perspective. It does this by internal simulation, i.e., themental con-
struction of an imagined alternative perspective (Schacter et al.,
2008). Thus, there are four forms of internal simulation (Buckner
and Carroll, 2007):
1. Episodic memory (remembering the past).
2. Navigation (orienting yourself topographically, i.e., in relation
to your surroundings).
3. Theory ofmind (taking someone else’s perspective onmatters).
4. Prospection (anticipating possible future events).
Each form of simulation has a different orientation (past,
present, or future) and each refers to the perspective of either the
first person, i.e., the agent itself, or another person.
Prospection – the mental simulation of future possibilities –
plays a central role in organizing perception, cognition, affect,
memory, motivation, and action (Seligman et al., 2013). Prospec-
tion is referred to in various ways, e.g., episodic future thinking,
memory of the future, pre-experiencing, proscopic chronesthesia,
mental time travel, and just plain imagination and it can involve
conceptual content and affective – emotional – states (Buckner
and Carroll, 2007).
Recent evidence suggests that all four kinds of internal simula-
tion involve a single core brain network and this network overlaps
what is known as the default-mode network, a set of interconnected
regions in the brain that is active when the agent is not occupied
with some attentional tasks (Østby et al., 2012).
It is significant that all four forms of simulation are construc-
tive, i.e., they involve a form of imagination. There is a difference
between knowing about the future and projecting ourselves into
the future. The latter is experiential and the former is not. Thus,
episodic memory (memory of experiences) and semantic mem-
ory (memory of facts) facilitate different types of prospection.
Episodic memory allows you to re-experience your past and pre-
experience your future. There is evidence that projecting yourself
forward in time is important when you form a goal, creating a
mental image of yourself acting out the event and then episodically
pre-experiencing the unfolding of a plan to achieve that goal. This
use of episodic memory in prospection is referred to as episodic
future thinking, a term coined by Cristina Atance and Daniela
O’Neill to refer to the ability to project oneself forward in time
to pre-experience an event (Atance and O’Neill, 2001; Szpunar,
2010).
The constructive aspect of episodic memory, whereby old
episodic memories are reconstructed slightly differently every
time a new episodic memory is assimilated or remembered, is
particularly important in the context of internal simulation of
events that have not been previously experienced. While episodic
memory certainly needs some constructive capacity to assemble
individual details into a coherent memory of a given episode, the
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter and Addis,
2007a,b; Schacter et al., 2008; Szpunar, 2010) suggests that its
role in prospection involving the simulation of multiple possible
futures imposes an even greater need for a constructive capacity
because of the need to extrapolate beyond past experiences. In
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other words, simulating multiple yet-to-be-experienced futures
requires flexibility in episodic memory. This flexibility is possible
because episodic memory is not an exact and perfect record of
experience but one that conveys the essence of an event and is open
to re-combination.
It is also significant that when humans imagine the future, they
not only anticipate an event, but they also anticipate how they feel
about that event. These are referred to as hedonic consequences of
the event: whether we feel good about it or bad about it, whether
it is associated with pleasure or pain, and lack of concern or
fear. Thus, the pre-experience of prospection also involves “pre-
feeling.” The brain accomplishes prospection by simulating the
event and the associated hedonic experience (Gilbert and Wilson,
2007). While pre-feeling is not always reliable because contextual
factors also play a part in the hedonic experience, this hedonic
aspect of episodic memory is important because it reflects the
affective nature of cognition and opens up a plausible way to factor
emotional drives and value systems into the operation of memory,
prospection, and action selection.
Internal Simulation and Action
In the preceding section, we considered internal simulation
entirely in terms of memory-based self-projection, using re-
assembled combinations of episodic memory to pre-experience
possible futures, re-experience (and possibly adjust) past expe-
riences, and project ourselves into the experiences of others.
However, we know that action plays a significant role in our
perceptions so the question then is: does action play a role in
internal simulation? The answer is a clear “yes” (Hesslow, 2002,
2012; Svensson et al., 2007). Internal simulation extends beyond
episodic memory and includes simulated interaction, particularly
embodied interaction. Although the terms simulation, internal
simulation, and mental simulation are widely used, you will also
see references being made to emulation, very often when the
approach endeavors to model the exact mechanism by which the
simulation is produced (Grush, 2004).
The Simulation Hypothesis
There are a number of simulation theories, but perhaps the most
influential is what is known as the simulation hypothesis (Hesslow,
2002, 2012). It makes three core assumptions:
1. The regions in the brain which are responsible for motor
control can be activated without causing bodily movement.
2. Perceptions can be caused by internal brain activity and not just
by external stimuli.
3. The brain has associative mechanisms that allow motor behav-
ior or perceptual activity to evoke other perceptual activity.
The first assumption allows for simulation of actions and is
often referred to as covert action or covert behavior. The second
allows for simulation of perceptions. The third assumption allows
simulated actions to elicit perceptions that are like those that
would have arisen if the actions had actually been performed.
There is an increasing amount of neurophysiological evidence in
support of all three assumptions (Svensson et al., 2013). If we link
these assumptions together, we see that the simulation hypothesis
FIGURE 1 | Internal simulation. (A) stimulus S1 elicits activity s1 in the
sensory cortex. This leads to the preparation of a motor command r1 and an
overt response R1. This alters the external situation, leading to S2, which
causes new perceptual activity, and so on. There is no internal simulation.
(B) The motor command r1 causes the internal simulation of an associated
perception of, for example, the consequence of executing that motor
command. (C) The internally simulated perception elicits the preparation of a
new motor command r2, i.e., a covert action, which in turn elicits the internal
simulation of a new perception s3 and a consequent covert action r3, and so
on [redrawn from Hesslow (2002)].
shows how the brain can simulate extended perception-action-
perception sequences by having the simulated perceptions elicit
simulated action which in turn elicits simulated perceptions, and
so on. Figure 1 summarizes the simulation hypothesis, showing
three situations, one where there is no internal simulation, one
where a motor response to an input stimulus causes the internal
simulation of an associated perception, and one where this inter-
nally simulated perception then elicits a covert action which in
turn elicits a simulated perception and a consequent covert action,
and so on.
Motor, Visual, and Mental Imagery
Action-directed internal simulation involves three different types
of anticipation: implicit, internal, and external (Svensson et al.,
2009). Implicit anticipation concerns the prediction of motor
commands from perceptions (which may have been simulated
in a previous phase of internal simulation). Internal anticipation
concerns the prediction of the proprioceptive consequences of
carrying out an action, i.e., the effect of an action on the agent’s
own body. External anticipation concerns the prediction of the
consequences for external objects and other agents of carrying
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out an action.4 Implicit anticipation selects some motor activity
(possibly covert, i.e., simulated) to be carried out based on an asso-
ciation between stimulus and actions; internal anticipation and
external anticipation then predict the consequences of that action.
Collectively, they simulate actions and the effects of actions.
Covert action involves what is referred to asmotor imagery and
simulation of perception is often referred to as visual imagery.
Perceptual imagery would perhaps be a better term since there is
evidence that humans use imagery from all the senses. In a way,
motor imagery is also a form of perceptual imagery, in the sense
that it involves the proprioceptive and kinesthetic sensations asso-
ciated with bodilymovement. However, reflecting the interdepen-
dence of perception and action, covert action often has elements
of bothmotor imagery and visual imagery and, vice versa, the sim-
ulation of perception often has elements of motor imagery. Visual
imagery andmotor imagery are sometimes referred to collectively
as mental imagery (Wintermute, 2012). Moulton and Kosslyn
(2009) identify several different types of perceptual imagery and
distinguish between two different types of simulation: instrumen-
tal simulation and emulative simulation. The former concerns
itself only with the content of the simulation while the latter also
replicates the process by which that content is created in the sim-
ulated event itself. They refer to this as second-order simulation.
Joint Perceptuo-Motor Representations
In the foregoing, we remarked on the fact that mental imagery,
viewed as another way of expressing the process of internal simu-
lation, comprises both visual imagery (or perceptual imagery) and
motor imagery. More importantly, though, we noted that these
two forms of imagery are tightly entwined: they complement each
other and the simulation of perception and covert action both
involve elements of visual and motor imagery.
Classical treatments of memory usually maintain a clear dis-
tinction between declarative memory and procedural memory, in
general, and between episodic memory and procedural memory,
in particular. However, contemporary research takes a slightly
different perspective, binding the twomore closely, e.g., themirror
neuron system, in particular. While it is still a major challenge to
understand how these two memory systems are combined, this
coupling is the basic idea underpinning joint perceptuo-motor
representations: representations that bring together the motoric
and sensory aspects of experience in one framework, such as that
anticipated in the simulation hypothesis.
In this section, we look at four approaches that have been
developed to address joint perceptuo-motor representations. First,
we look at two approaches to implementing ideo-motor theory in
cognitive robotics: Shanahan’s Global Workspace Theory archi-
tecture and Demiris’s HAMMER architecture. We follow this by
highlighting two additional approaches that endeavor to inte-
grate perceptuo-motor representations more tightly: the Theory
of Event Coding (TEC) andObject-ActionComplexes. Since none
of these explicitly incorporate episodic or procedural memory, we
then suggest a way of drawing the principal ideas of each together
4The terms internal anticipation and external anticipation are also referred to as
bodily anticipation and environmental anticipation (Svensson et al., 2013).
in a form of explicit joint episodic-procedural memory. We then
argue that this joint episodic-procedural memory allows several
of the challenges of cognitive robotics to be addressed.
Before discussing these, to provide the necessary context for
prospective perceptuo-motor representations, we first address the
difference between sensory-motor theory and ideo-motor theory.
Sensory-Motor Theory and Ideo-Motor Theory
Broadly speaking, there are the two distinct approaches for
planning actions: sensory-motor action planning and ideo-motor
action planning (Stock and Stock, 2004). Sensory-motor action
planning treats actions as reactive responses to sensory stimuli
and assumes that perception and action use distinct and sepa-
rate representational frameworks. The sensory-motor view builds
on the classic unidirectional data-driven information-processing
approach to perception, proceeding stage by stage from stimulus
to percept and then to response. It is unidirectional in that it does
not allow the results of later processing to influence earlier pro-
cessing. In particular, it does not allow the resultant (or intended)
action to impact on the related sensory perception.
Ideo-motor action planning, on the other hand, treats action as
the result of internally generated goals. It is the idea of achieving
some action outcome, rather than some external stimulus, that
is at the core of how cognitive agents behave. This reflects the
view of action described above, with action being initiated by a
motivated subject, defined by goals, and guided by prospection.
The key point of the ideo-motor principle is that the selection
and control of a particular goal-directed movement depends on
the anticipation of the sensory consequence of accomplishing the
intended action: the agent images (e.g., through internal simula-
tion) the desired outcome and selects the appropriate actions in
order to achieve it.
There is an important difference, though, between the con-
crete movements comprising an action and the higher-order
goals of an action. Typically, actors do not voluntarily pre-
select the exact movements required to achieve a desired goal.
Instead, they select prospectively guided intention-directed goal-
focused action, with the specific movements being adaptively
controlled as the action is executed. Thus, ideo-motor theory
should be viewed both as an anticipatory idea-centered way of
selecting actions and as a way of bridging the higher-order con-
ceptual representations of intentions and goals5 with the con-
crete adaptive control of movements when executing that action
(Ondobaka and Bekkering, 2012).
In contrast to sensory-motor models, ideo-motor theory
assumes that perception and action share a common representa-
tional framework. Because ideo-motormodels focus on goals, and
because they use a common joint representation that embraces
both perception and action, they provide an intuitive explanation
of why cognitive agents, humans in particular, are so adept at
and predisposed to imitation (Iacoboni, 2009). The essential idea
is that when I see somebody else’s (goal-directed) actions and
5Michael Tomasello and colleagues note that the distinction between intentions and
goals is not always clearly made. Taking their lead from Michael Bratman (1998),
they define an intention as a plan of action an agent chooses and commits itself to
in pursuit of a goal. An intention therefore includes both a means (i.e. an action
plan) as well as a goal (Tomasello et al., 2005).
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the consequences of these actions, the representations of my own
actions that would produce the same consequences are activated.
At first glance, ideo-motor theory seems to present a puzzle:
how can the goal, achieved through action, cause the action in
the first place? In other words, how can the later outcome affect
the earlier action? This seems to be a case of backward causation.
The solution to the puzzle is prospection. It is the anticipated goal
state, not the achieved goal state, that impacts on the associated
planned action. Goal-directed action, then, is a center-piece of
ideo-motor theory, which is also referred to as the goal trigger
hypothesis (Hommel et al., 2001).
Before proceeding to consider two cognitive architectures that
build on ideo-motor theory, we mention cognitive maps to high-
light the importance of joint perceptuo-motor representations in
animal and robot cognition. The idea of a cognitive map was
introduced by Tolman as a geometric representation to support
navigation in biological agents (Tolman, 1948). While there is a
certain lack of consensus on what exactly constitutes a cognitive
map (Bennett, 1996; Eichenbaum et al., 1999), most agree that it
involves metric information rather than purely topological infor-
mation to encode spatial relationships in an allocentric framework
and that it exploits path integration, at least partially, to effect
navigation (Gallistel, 1989, 1990; Stachenfeld et al., 2014); for an
alternative perspective, see Gaussier et al. (2002). In any case,
a cognitive map combines memories of environmental cues (or
perceptual landmarks) with geometrical properties of space that
are specified by the remembered landmarks (Metta et al., 2010).
Based on the existence of the hippocampus place cells (O’Keefe,
1976), O’Keefe and Nadel suggested that the hippocampal forma-
tion provides the neural basis for the cognitive map (O’Keefe and
Nadel, 1978).
However, the hippocampus does not just create and store cog-
nitive maps but it also plays a part in episodic memory, e.g.,
helping to minimize the similarities between new representations
and representations that already exist in memory (McNaugton
et al., 2006). As with episodic memory, it is also responsible for
associating information in ways that allow flexible use of past
experiences to guide future actions (flexible memory expression)
(Eichenbaum et al., 1999; McNamara and Shelton, 2003). Fur-
thermore, it has a role as a prediction mechanism for novelty
detection and especially as a way to merge planning and sensory-
motor function in a single coherent system (Gaussier et al., 2002).
As McNaughton et al. note, “. our current understanding of [the
hippocampal formation] underscores the growing paradigm shift
in the neurosciences away from thinking about neural coding as
being driven primarily by bottom-up, sensory inputs, but rather
as a reflection of rich and complex internal dynamics” (McNaug-
ton et al., 2006). Taken together, the characteristics of cognitive
maps and the operation of the hippocampal formation echo the
arguments being put forward in this paper about the importance
of joint perceptuo-motor representations in cognition.
The Global Workspace Cognitive Architecture
Shanahan (Shanahan, 2005a,b, 2006; Shanahan and Baars, 2005)
proposes a biologically plausible brain-inspired neural-level
cognitive architecture in which cognitive functions such as antici-
pation and planning are realized through internal simulation of
interaction with the environment. Action selection, both actual
FIGURE 2 | The Global Workspace Theory cognitive architecture:
achieving prospection by sensori-motor simulation [redrawn from
Shanahan (2006)].
and internally simulated, is mediated by affect. The architec-
ture is based on an external sensori-motor loop and an internal
sensori-motor loop in which information passes throughmultiple
competing cortical areas and a global workspace (Baars, 1998,
2002).
Shanahan’s cognitive architecture is comprised of the following
components: a first-order sensori-motor loop, closed externally
through the world, and a higher-order sensori-motor loop,
closed internally through associative memories (see Figure 2).
The first-order loop comprises the sensory cortex and the basal
ganglia (controlling the motor cortex), together providing a
reactive action-selection sub-system. The second-order loop
comprises two associative cortex elements which carry out
off-line simulations of the system’s sensory and motor behavior,
respectively. The first associative cortex simulates a motor
output while the second simulates the sensory stimulus expected
to follow from a given motor output. The higher-order loop
effectively modulates basal ganglia action selection in the first-
order loop via an affect-driven amygdala component. Thus,
this cognitive architecture is able to anticipate and plan for
potential behavior through the exercise of its “imagination” (i.e.,
its associative internal sensori-motor simulation).
The HAMMER Architecture
While internal simulation is an essential aspect of human cogni-
tion, it is also an increasingly important part of artificial cognitive
systems. For example, TheHierarchical AttentiveMultipleModels
for Execution andRecognition (HAMMER) architecture (Demiris
and Khadhouri, 2006; Demiris et al., 2014) builds on the simula-
tion hypothesis, accomplishing internal simulation using forward
and inverse models which encode internal sensori-motor models
that the agent would utilize if it were to execute that action (see
Figure 3).
HAMMER deploys several inverse-forward pairs to simulate
multiple possible futures using a winner-take-all attention process
to select the most appropriate action to execute. HAMMER
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FIGURE 3 | The HAMMER architecture, showing multiple inverse models
(B1 to Bn) taking as input the current system state, which includes a
desired goal, suggesting motor commands (M1 to Mn), with which the
corresponding forward models (F1 to Fn) form predictions of the
system’s next state (P1 to Pn). These predictions are verified at the next time
state, resulting in a set of error signals (E1 to En). Redrawn from Demiris and
Khadhouri (2006). See also Demiris et al. (2014) for an alternative rendering of
the HAMMER architecture.
includes recurrent connections, thereby allowing multi-stage
extended internal simulation and mental rehearsal. This pro-
vides the architecture with a way of encapsulating the internal
simulation hypothesis proposed by Hesslow (2002, 2012).
The inverse model takes as input information about the current
state of the system and the desired goal, and it outputs the motor
commands necessary to achieve that goal. The forward model
acts as a predictor. It takes as input the motor commands and
simulates the perception that would arise if this motor command
were to be executed, just as the simulation hypothesis envisages.
HAMMER then provides the output of the inverse model as the
input to the forwardmodel. This allows a goal state (demonstrated,
for example, by another agent or possibly recalled from episodic
memory) to elicit the simulated action required to achieve it. This
simulated action is then usedwith the forwardmodel to generate a
simulated outcome, i.e., the outcome that would arise if the motor
commandswere to be executed. The simulated perceived outcome
is then compared to the desired goal perception and the results
are then fed back to the inverse model to allow it to adjust any
parameters of the action.
A distinguishing feature of the HAMMER architecture is that it
operates multiple pairs of inverse and forward models in parallel,
each one representing a simulation – a hypothesis – of how the
goal action can be achieved. The choice of inverse/forward model
pair is made by an internal attention process based on how close
the predicted outcome is to the desired one. Furthermore, it
provides for the hierarchical composition of primitive actions into
more complex sequences.
From Perceptuo-Motor Mappings to
Perceptuo-Motor Memory
Both Global Workspace Theory and HAMMER are good models
of the simulation hypothesis for internal simulation as a vehicle
for prospection in cognition. However, they focus on themapping
between perception andmotor command, withmemory being left
implicit (see Figures 4 and 5).
Othermodels, such as theTheory of Event Coding (TEC) (Hom-
mel et al., 2001) and Object Action Complexes (OACs) (Krüger
et al., 2011) attempt to provide a tighter coupling of the perceptual
and motor aspect in a joint perceptuo-motor representation.
The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) is a representational frame-
work for combining perception and action planning. It focuses
mainly on the later stages of perception and the earlier phases
of action. As such, it concerns itself with perceptual features but
not with how those features are extracted or computed. Similarly,
it concerns itself with preparing actions – action planning – but
not with the final execution of those actions and the adaptive
control of various parts of the agent’s body. The main idea is
that perception, attention, intention, and action all work with a
common representation and, furthermore, that action depends on
both external and internal causes.
TEC provides a basis for combining both sensory-motor and
ideo-motor action planning (Stock and Stock, 2004) and to be
a joint representation that serves both sensory-stimulated action
and prospective goal-directed action. The core concept in TEC is
the event code. This is effectively a structured aggregation of distal
features of an event in the agent’s world. These feature codes can
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FIGURE 4 | Prospection by internal simulation achieved by (A) direct
perceptuo-motor mappings as envisaged, e.g., by Hesslow (2002,
2012), and by (B) joint perception and motor memory mapping as
envisaged, e.g., by Shanahan (2006).
FIGURE 5 | Prospection by internal simulation achieved by inverse
models mapping from current state and goal state to predicted motor
command, then validating this by mapping from predicted motor
command to predicted perceptual outcome, as envisaged by Demiris
and Khadhouri (2006) and Demiris et al. (2014). Many mappings are
possible so an internal attention winner-take-all competition selects the most
appropriate action to take.
be relatively simple (e.g., color, shape, moving to the left, falling)
or more complex, such as an affordance. Also, TEC feature codes
can emerge through the agent’s experience; they do not have to be
pre-specified. A given TEC feature code is associated with both
the sensory system and the motor system. Typically, a feature
code is derived from several proximal sensory sources (sensory
codes) and it contributes to several proximal motor actuators
(motor codes). Each event code comprises several feature codes
representing some event, be it a perceived event or a planned
event. Feature codes associated with an event are activated both
when the event is perceived and when it is planned. Because
features can be elements of many event codes, the activation of
a given feature effectively primes, i.e., predisposes, all the other
events of which this feature is a component.
Inspired by the Theory of Event coding, an Object-Action
Complex (OAC) (Krüger et al., 2011) is a triple, i.e., a unit with
three components: (E, T, M). E is an “execution specification”
(effectively an action). T is a function that predicts how the
attributes that characterize the current state of the agent’s world
will change if the execution specification is executed. Effectively,
of T as a prediction of how the agent’s perceptions will change as
a result of carrying out the actions given by E. M is a statistical
measure of the success of the OAC’s past predictions. In this
way, an OAC combines the essential elements of a joint repre-
sentation – perception and action – with a predictor that links
current perceived states and future predicted perceived states that
would result from carrying out that action. To a large extent, an
OAC models an agent’s interaction with the world as it executes
some motor program (this is referred to as a low-level control
program C P in the OAC literature). For example, an OAC might
encode how to grasp an object or push an object into a given
position and orientation (usually referred to as the object pose).
OACs can be learned and executed, and they can be combined
intomore complex representations of actions and their perceptual
consequences.
To date, neither TEC nor OAC has been embedded in the more
general internal simulation framework described above. So, it is
proposed here that there is a strong case for making memory –
episodic and procedural – more explicit and embedding them in
an internal simulation framework (such as that envisaged in the
simulation hypothesis, the GWTArchitecture, and theHAMMER
architecture) in a way that makes their links more explicit (such
as that envisaged in TEC and OAC). We address such a possible
framework on the next section.
A Network-Based Joint Episodic-
Procedural Memory for Internal Simulation
The core idea being proposed is to unwind the temporal and
causal relationships between specific perceptions and actions that
are implicit in the mappings of, e.g., GWT and HAMMER, and
make them explicit in a weighted network of associations between
perceptions and actions, in the manner of TEC and OAC (see
Figure 6). In doing so, it makes the input to the joint perceptuo-
motor mapping explicit as perceptual episodic memories and
motoric procedural memories (see Figures 7 and 8). In the case of
episodic memory, this provides a way to include other modalities
including affective or hedonic memories. Procedural memory
operates associatively in their own right: such procedural mem-
ories are not static but are dynamic and adapt as the action is
executed.
Furthermore, such a framework allows one to expose the map-
ping dynamics explicitly. This may have several advantages in, for
example, cognitive development which focuses on extending the
timescale of the agent’s prospective capacity and expanding the
agent’s repertoire of actions. Specifically, development might be
facilitated by adjusting and adapting the network structure – its
topology and strength of connectivity – as a function of experi-
ential learning, intrinsic value systems (Merrick, 2010), including
those derived from autonomic self-maintenance (Bickhard, 2000),
and affective homeostasis and allostasis (Sterling, 2004, 2012;
Morse et al., 2008; Ziemke and Lowe, 2009).
The network model of joint episodic-procedural memory facil-
itates prospection in three senses: prospection by predicting the
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org July 2015 | Volume 2 | Article 198
Vernon et al. Episodic-procedural memory in cognitive robotics
FIGURE 6 | Joint episodic-procedural memory as an explicit network
of associations between perceptions and actions, drawn from
episodic and procedural memories, unwinding the temporal and
causal relationships between specific perceptions and actions that
are implicit in the mappings of other perceptuo-motor
representations.
FIGURE 7 | The episodic elements of the joint episodic-procedural
memory are drawn from episodic memory and therefore operate
associatively in their own right. Furthermore, this provides a way to
include other modalities of episodic memory (top right) including affective or
hedonic memories.
outcome of an action carried out in given perceptual circum-
stances, prospection by predicting the action required to achieve
a goal in given perceptual circumstances, and abductive inference
of the perceptual states that explains an outcome of a give action
(see Figure 9).
Keeping episodic memory explicit in this framework preserves
the flexibility for adaptive reconstruction and novel association.
Since episodic memory operates by recombining imperfectly
recalled past experience, this allows it to simulate new or unex-
pected events as outlined above.
There is, however, a potential problem in that the scope for
exponential growth in association is significant. Something is
needed to constrain this potential combinatorial explosion if such
a joint episodic-procedural memory system is to be capable of
FIGURE 8 | The procedural elements of the joint episodic-procedural
memory are drawn from procedural memory and, again, operate
associatively in their own right. Such procedural memories are not static
but are dynamic and adapt as the action is executed (top right).
FIGURE 9 | The network model of joint episodic-procedural memory
facilitates prospection in three senses: (A) prospection by predicting
the outcome of an action carried out in given perceptual
circumstances, (B) prospection by predicting the action required to
achieve a goal in given perceptual circumstances, and (C) abductive
inference of the perceptual states that explains an outcome of a give
action.
useful prospection through internal simulation. Because the asso-
ciative links are exposed explicitly in the network organization,
this framework for a joint episodic-procedural memory allows the
internal simulation to be conditioned by current context, semantic
memory, and the agent’s value system by adjusting the associa-
tive links. Context and semantics constrain the combinatorial
explosion of potential perception-action associations and allow
effective action selection in the pursuit of goals, while the value
system modulates the memory network to promote the agent’s
autonomy and cognitive development.
Finally, the approach being suggested here is an abstract schema
and is therefore neutral regarding the final implementation of
these episodic and procedural memories. These can be effected
either as an emergent cognitive system, instantiating them sub-
symbolically in a biologically inspired manner as associative net-
works [e.g., Hopfield nets such as in Mohan et al. (2014) or
brain-based devices such as in Krichmar and Edelman (2005,
2006)]. Alternatively, they can be effected symbolically as more
traditional AI systems. For example, episodic memory might
be implemented using content-addressable image databases with
traditional image indexing and recall algorithms, while proce-
dural memory could be encapsulated in databases of motor-
control scripts derived from experiential learning or from shared
resources [e.g., Tenorth and Beetz (2009) and Tenorth et al.
(2012, 2013)]. The traditional AI implementation, for the pur-
pose of practical cognitive robotics, has a number of advantages.
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Although episodic memory will typically exploit by iconic repre-
sentations, these representations are often augmented by symbolic
tags when derived from on-line repositories. This symbolic tag-
ging makes the integration of semantic knowledge much easier.
The fact that both episodic memory and procedural memory are
derived from experience, directly or indirectly, also finesses the
symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990; Sloman). The tradi-
tional AI implementation also renders the knowledge contained
in the memory inherently transferrable to other agents, provided
their sensory systems are compatible and there is a known map-
ping – direct or indirect – between the embodiments of each agent,
as described in Argall et al. (2009).
An Example Joint Episodic-Procedural
Memory for Overt Attention
The iCub is a 53 degree-of-freedom humanoid robot (see
Figure 10) that was designed to be an open-systems platform for
research in cognitive development (Sandini et al., 2007; Tsagarakis
et al., 2007; Metta et al., 2010). It is approximately 1m tall, weighs
22 kg, has visual, vestibular, auditory, and haptic sensors, and
is capable of dexterous manipulation. To date, iCubs have been
delivered to over 20 research laboratories in Europe and one in
the U.S.A.6
The original iCub cognitive architecture (Sandini et al., 2007;
Vernon et al., 2010) focused on gaze-modulated goal-directed
reaching and locomotion. Episodic memory and procedural
memory were designed to effect internal simulation in order to
provide capabilities for prediction and model construction boot-
strapped by learned affordances. Motivations encapsulated in the
system’s affective state addressed curiosity and experimentation,
both of which are exploratory motives, triggered by exogenous
and endogenous factors, respectively. This distinction between the
exogenous and the endogenouswas reflected in the overt attention
system that could be triggered by both external and internal
events. A simple process of homeostatic self-regulation governed
by the affective state provided elementary action selection. Finally,
all the various components of the cognitive architecture operated
concurrently so that a sequence of states representing cognitive
behavior emerges from the interaction of many separate parallel
processes rather than being dictated by somepre-programed state-
machine.
In the variant of the iCub cognitive architecture presented
here, the separate episodic and procedural memories have been
replaced by a simple proof-of-principle joint episodic-procedural
memory (see Figure 11). This is the focus of the current article
and the specific objective is to investigate how a joint episodic-
procedural memory can be used for representation, develop-
ment, and adaptation of scan-path patterns that result from overt
and covert attention. This particular model of attention uses an
information-theoretic saliency map (Bruce and Tsotsos, 2009)
with an overt attention system comprising (1) the winner-take-
all process effected by a selective tuning model to identify a single
focus of attention (Tsotsos et al., 1995; Tsotsos, 2006, 2011), (2) an
Inhibition-Of-Return (IOR)mechanism to attenuate the attention
6For more information on the iCub robot see http://www.icub.org.
FIGURE 10 | The iCub humanoid robot: an open-systems platform for
research in cognitive development.
value of previous winning locations so that new regions become
the focus of attention, and (3) a habituation process to reduce
the salience of the current focus of attention with time thereby
ensuring that attention is fixated on a given point for a limited
period (Zaharescu et al., 2004). Fixation points are represented
using retinotopic images rather than conventional rectangular
regularly sampled images. The retinotopic images are constructed
using a scale and rotation-invariant log-polar transform (Brac-
cini et al., 1981; Berton, 2006; Berton et al., 2006; Traver and
Bernardino, 2010) to map the Cartesian camera image data to a
non-uniformly sampled image that reflects the foveated sampling
in the primate retina. The resultant scan path patterns are captured
in an elementary joint episodic-procedural memory: the episodes
are retinotopic log-polar images of the fixation points and the
actions are the saccade angles.
The episodic memory in the iCub cognitive architecture is a
simple associatively recalled memory of autobiographical events.
It is a form on one-shot learning and does not generalize multiple
instances of an observed event. In the current implementation,
the episodic memory provides a purely visual iconic memory of
landmark appearance using scale- and rotation-invariant7 retino-
topic log-polar images as the landmark representation (Brac-
cini et al., 1981; Berton, 2006; Berton et al., 2006; Traver and
Bernardino, 2010) with image recognition being effected using
color histogram intersection (Swain and Ballard, 1990, 1991). In
essence, the iCub episodicmemory implements a form of content-
addressable memory which is populated by log-polar landmark
images acquired under the control of the iCub’s covert and overt
attention sub-system.
Procedural memory maintains a very simple repository of
elementary actions. The current implementation comprises gaze
motor commands in a body-centered frame of reference and sym-
bolic tags denoting one of five possible associated actions (reach,
push, grasp, locomote, or wait). These are just placeholders for
7The rotation invariance of log-polar images is restricted to roll: rotation about the
camera’s principal axis.
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FIGURE 11 | A variant of the iCub cognitive architecture (Vernon et al.,
2007, 2010) targeting visual attention with information-theoretic exogen-
ous salience (Bruce and Tsotsos, 2009), the Selective Tuning Model for
saccade selection (Tsotsos et al., 1995; Tsotsos, 2006, 2011), overt
attention with inhibition of return and habituation modulated scan path
dynamics (Zaharescu et al., 2004), and joint episodic-procedural memory.
more flexible and adaptive gaze-directed motor control schemes
[e.g., Lukic et al. (2012)] to be implemented later.
The joint episodic-procedural memory itself is a network of
associations between motor events and pairs of sensory events. In
this variant of the iCub cognitive architecture, a sensory event is a
visual landmark which has been acquired by the iCub and stored
in the episodic memory. A motor event is a gaze saccade with an
optional reaching, grasping, or locomotionmovement. Thus, joint
episodic-procedural memory can be viewed as a directed network
with two types of nodes, one representing sensory patterns –
retinotopic log-polar images of the fixation points – and the other
representing motor patterns – the saccade motor commands.
A path through the network traverses alternately sensory and
motor nodes and any clique in this memory network effectively
captures a causal relationship between a sensory state, a motor
state, and a subsequent sensory state (or a sequence of such associ-
ations). An extended path in this memory captures the scan path
pattern of the robot as it pays attention to its visual environment
(see Figure 12).
The key feature of this form of joint episodic-procedural mem-
ory representation of the attention pattern of the robot is that it
lends itself to development: modulation or dynamically recon-
figuration of the connectivity of this network – which is learned
from experience – so that its prospective capacity increases as
new memories are added as a result of the agent’s interaction with
its environment. Various forms of adaptive reconfiguration are
currently being examined, some based on small world networks
(Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Newman, 2000; Bohland and Minai,
2001; Kleinberg, 2006; Telesford et al., 2011) and others based
on information theoretic models that dynamically modulate the
pathways in flow networks (Ulanowicz, 2000).
Conclusion
While action and prospection are intimately linked, most research
on prospection has tended to focus on the constructive role of
episodic memory (Tulving, 1972, 1984; Seligman et al., 2013),
i.e., the so-called episodic future thinking (Atance and O’Neill,
2001), often achieved through internal simulation, i.e., the men-
tal construction of an imagined alternative perspectives (Buck-
ner and Carroll, 2007) and simulated embodied interaction
(Svensson et al., 2007). Although hedonic affective experience has
been addressed to some extent (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; Lowe
and Ziemke, 2011), procedural memory has been neglected in
modeling prospective capacities. When it is included, it usu-
ally takes the form of distinct forward models that predict the
sensory outcome of a given motor command (Hesslow, 2002,
2012; Shanahan, 2006) and inverse models that determine the
action required to produce a given goal perception (Demiris
and Khadhouri, 2006). Ideo-motor theory (Stock and Stock,
2004; Iacoboni, 2009) is an exception to this. It assumes that
perception and action share a common representational frame-
work and that action is the causal result of internally gener-
ated goals. Such a joint representation provides greater flexibility
in prospection through both inductive inference and abductive
inference.
With few exceptions, such as the Theory of Event
Coding (Hommel et al., 2001) and object-action complexes
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FIGURE 12 | A screen shot of an experiment using joint
episodic-procedural memory with covert attention: (top left) the
fixation point identified by the Selective Tuning Model (Tsotsos
et al., 1995; Tsotsos, 2006, 2011) based on (bottom left) the
information-theoretic exogenous salience (Bruce and Tsotsos,
2009) and (top middle) the inhibition of return and habituation
Gaussian modulation functions; (bottom middle) the retinotopic
log-polar episodic memory – the current fixation image is denoted
by the red rectangle and the blue shirt is clearly visible in the fovea;
(top right) the input image shifts to place the fixation point at the
center; (bottom right) a graphic visualization of the joint
episodic-procedural memory, with fixation-point episodes rendered
as green circles, saccade actions rendered as red circles, and
graph connections as directed arrows. Note that this graph is not
registered with the image since the actions are specified in gaze angles,
not image coordinates.
(Krüger et al., 2011), joint perceptuo-motor representations have
received little attention and none have addressed integration of
hedonic affective experience. Our conjecture is that an internal
simulation capability founded on ideo-motor theory and joint
representations, and drawing on recent progress in the modeling-
related mirror neuron system (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al.,
1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Thill et al., 2013), pro-
vides a viable way to approach the integration of procedural and
episodic memory as a joint perceptuo-motor system. Our specific
contention is that it is helpful to conceive of this joint episodic-
procedural memory – for goal-directed internal simulation – as
a network of associations between elements of both episodic and
procedural memories. This perspective is neutral regarding the
final implementation of these episodic and procedural memories
and it can facilitate both emergent and cognitivist AI approaches.
We argue that such a framework meets several challenges in
cognitive robotics such as the need to accommodate modal and
modal episodic data and extended perceptuo-motor sequences,
as well as mechanisms for conditioning the association dynam-
ics with external constraints derived from semantic declarative
knowledge, current context, and affective value signals. It also
addresses the need to integrate the episodic andprocedural knowl-
edge gathered by robots as they operate of their physical envi-
ronment with information extracted from web-based knowledge
bases. This is particularly important if the power of indirect
knowledge (acquired by interpreting third-party descriptions) is
to be harnessed in the development of robot skills.
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